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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the lower court properly refuse to instruct the

jury on the defense of habitation?
2.

Did the lower court properly act within its

discretion in sentencing the defendant?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860158

-vPriority No. 2

JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA,

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated
Assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103 (1953, as amended), in a jury trial held October 21-22,
1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding.
Judge Conder sentenced defendant on March 31, 1986 to two
concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of August 21, 1985, the
defendant knocked on the door of his estranged wife's home (T. 8,
96).

Mrs. McKenna had been separated from defendant for six

months (Tr. 6 ) , and had been residing with Mr. Steve Lujan (Tr.
6, 3 5 ) . Mrs. McKenna answered the door, told defendant that he
should have called prior to coming to the house, and asked
defendant to leave (Tr. 8, 9, 96). Whereupon defendant stated,
"That means you have company, huh?

Ifll kill him." (Tr. 9 ) .

Defendant ran downstairs and grabbed a pistol out of his truck

(Tr. 9, 98); Mrs. McKenna went to the phone to call the police
when defendant ran into the house, grabbed the telephone from
Mrs. McKenna and threw it on the table (Tr. 9, 10, 100, 119).
Defendant went directly into Mrs. McKenna's bedroom (Tr. 11,
100), and found Mr. Lujan lying on the floor (Tr. 102).
Defendant began to hit and kick Mr. Lujan and pointed the gun at
him and told him to "get up." (Tr. 102). The defendant then
forced Mr. Lujan out of the house threatening him with the gun
(Tr. 11, 7 0 ) . Mr. Lujan went to a neighboring house and called
the police (Tr. 70, 71).
Defendant stood at the living room window watching for
Mr. Lujan, and stated at trial "I was just looking for an excuse
to shoot that sucker at that time.

I was pretty angry,

especially when she was..." (Tr. 107). Mrs. McKenna and
defendant then began to argue and defendant continuously hit her
in the back of the head with the gun while threatening to kill
her (Tr. 12, 13, 107-08,).

Defendant further kicked Mrs. McKenna

in the stomach and pushed her onto the couch (Tr. 13, 108).
During the argument, Mrs. McKenna was shot in the
shoulder (Tr. 15, 16). She testified that after Defendant pushed
her onto the couch he pointed the gun at her face and she slapped
the gun away as the gun discharged (Tr. 15, 16). Defendant
testified that he put the gun to his own head and Mrs. McKenna
grabbed his arm as the gun discharged (Tr. .109).
Mrs. McKenna, defendant called an ambulance

After wounding

(Tr. 21) but

continued to hit her with the gun, pushing her against the wall
(Tr. 18, 2 7 ) . Mrs. McKenna was treated for the gunshot wound and
also required stitches to the back of her head (Tr. 22).
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Section 76-2-40 5 provides:
(1) A person is justified in using force
against another when to the extent that he
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the otherfs unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation:
however, he is justified in the use of force
which is intended or likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a
violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously,
or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that
the entry is attempted or made for the purpose
of assaulting or offering personal violence
to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he reasonably believes that the
force is necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry
is made or attempted for the purpose of
committing a felony in the habitation and
that the force is necessary to prevent the
commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or deadly force
in defense of habitation is presumed for the
purpose of both civil and xriminal cases to
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable
fear of imminent peril of death or serious
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.
[Emphasis added.]
Before the statute is applicable, the entry must be
unlawful; thus, the defense of habitation is limited to those
cases where a defendant is attempting to prevent a forcible or
unlawful entry into his home.
In State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978), decided
under § 76-2-405 prior to the amendment of the statute, this
Court affirmed the trial courtfs refusal to give a defense of

habitation jury instruction.1

There, this Court found that no

evidence existed that the entry was unlawful or violent and thus
the denial of the instruction was proper.

See also State v.

McLaurin, 266 S.E.2d 406, 408 (N.C.App. 1980).

Further,

defendant may not assert the defense where the victim enters the
premises lawfully, but subsequently engages in unlawful conduct.
People v. Chapman, 49 Ill.App.3d 553, 7 111.Dec. 416, 364 N.E.2d
577 (1977); People v. Brown, 19 Ill.App.3d 757, 312 N.E.2d 789
(1974) .
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-405 (1953) is substantively similar
to the defense of habitation statutes in Montana and Illinois.
Those states have interpreted their statutes as requiring that
the entry must be unlawful before the defense statute is
applicable.

State v. Sorensen, 619 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980);

People v. Chapman, 49 Ill.App.3d 553, 7 111.Dec. 416, 364 N.E.2d
577 (1977) . An unlawful entry occurs when:
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in
or upon premises when the premises or any
portion thereof at the time of the entry or
remaining are not open to the public and when
the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or
such portion thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3) (1953, as amdended)
There is strong social interest in preventing any
unlawful entry of the dwelling and the dweller is privileged to
use reasonable nondeadly force in the effort to prevent such an

1

Although § 76-2-40 5 has been amended since Dock, the provision
in § 76-2-405 relied upon by this Court in Dock is substantially
the same as the amended version of § 76-2-40 5.

entry.

However, the privilege to use deadly force to prevent an

unlawful entry of the dwelling is limited to cases of entry with
the specific intent to commit a felony and does not apply to an
entry attempted for the mere purpose of making a personal assault
which is neither intended nor likely to kill or to inflict great
bodily injury.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(1) (b)(1985); Carroll v.

State. 23 Ala. 28 (1853); State v. Countryman, 57 Kan. 815, 48 P.
137 (1897); State v. Tavlor, 143 Mo. 150, 165 (1898).

The

statutory authority to use force to prevent or terminate an
unlawful entry, has no application to a lawful entry, even if the
entrant later engaged in unlawful conduct.
619 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1980).

State v. Sorenson,

.See also W. LaFave and H. Scott,

Jr., Criminal Law § 55 (1972 ed.).
In the case at bar, the defendant requests this Court
to find that he was justified in using force to terminate the
commission of a felony within a habitation he was authorized to
defend, under § 76-2-405(1) (b) . Before this Court can reach §
76-2-405(1)(b), it is necessary for this Court to find under §
76-2-405(1) that:

1) The defendant was residing with Mrs.

McKenna, and 2) Mr. Lujan unlawfully entered the defendant's
habitation.
First, the defendant was not residing with Mrs.
McKenna.

The State acknowledges that the defense of habitation

statute includes not only a person's actual residence, but
whatever place he may be occupying.

State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d

1120f 1122 (Utah 1977) .2

However, the record clearly indicates

that defendant did not reside with Mrs. McKenna at 550 West 400
North nor was he invited onto the premises (Tr. 6, 94). The
parties maintained separate residences for five or six months
prior to August 21, 1985 (Tr. 6 ) . Although the parties may have
lived together for approximately a ten-day period around the 7th
of August (Tr. 94), defendant was not residing at the house on
August 21, 1985 and was not authorized to be at the house (Tr.
7).

Thus, the defense of habitation statute was not available to

defendant, since he was not defending his habitation.
Second, assuming this Court finds the defendant was
residing with Mrs. McKenna, this Court must then find that Mr.
Lujan unlawfully entered the premises.

The defendant knew that

Mrs. McKenna had invited Mr. Lujan into her home (Tr. 99).
Although Mr. Lujan may have engaged in felonious conduct after
his lawful entry, § 405 justifies the use of force only to
prevent an unlawful entry.
1185 (Mont. 1980).

See also State v. Sorensen, 619 P.2d

Thus, once Mr. Lujan lawfully entered the

premises, the defense was inapplicable.
Finally, assuming the defendant did reside with Mrs.
McKenna, and Mr. Lujan's entry was unlawful, § 76-2-405(1) (b)
justifies the use of deadly force when the occupant reasonably
believes the use of force is necessary to prevent the commission
of a felony.

1

Defendant has offered no proof that deadly force

Although § 76-2-40 5 was amended after Mitcheson, the amendment
does not appear to affect the definition of habitation in
Mitcheson.

was necessary to prevent the felony of bigamy.

In fact, when

defendant went to Mrs. McKenna's house on August 21, 1985, she
did not request his assistance but asked him to leave (Tr. 9 ) , to
which the defendant responded "That means you have company, huh?
I'll kill him." (Tr. 9 ) . Mr. Lujan did not threaten defendant in
any manner (Tr. 102, 123), and when defendant kicked Mr. Lujan in
the ribs and hit him in the head, Mr. Lujan did not resist (Tr.
103, 123). Although defendant asserted that he was trying to
prevent open fornication in front of his children (App. Br. 8,
Tr. 99), defendant further testified that the children usually
slept in their bedroom and that he did not know the children were
sleeping in the living room until after defendant got the gun
(Tr. 121). Thus, defendant did not know if the children had
witnessed any sexual acts until after he got his gun (Tr. 121).
Defendant asserts he was justified in using force to
prevent the commission of a felony; however, once Mr. Lujan left
the residence the defendant proceeded to slap Mrs. McKenna and
strike her in the head with the gun (Tr. 11, 12). He also
pointed the gun at Mrs. McKenna and threatened to kill her (Tr.
12).

Defendant asserts, under the defense of habitation statute,

that he was justified in threatening Mrs. McKenna with the gun
because she attacked him (App. Br. 12). Again, before this
argument can be addressed, this Court must necessarily find that
defendant was a resident of the home at 550 West 400 North, Salt
Lake City, and thus, had the right to defend his residence.
However, it is clear that defendant did not reside at 550 West
400 North (Tr. 6, 9 4 ) . Even assuming the defendant did reside at

this address, where both the antagonist and the assailed are
legal occupants of the same residence, neither one having the
right to eject the other, the defense of habitation is
inapplicable.

Conner v. State. 361 So.2d 774 (Fla. App. 1978).

Defendant strongly argues that under State v.
Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977) he was authorized to use
force in defense of his home.

There, the defendant visited his

sister1s home and this Court found that this was enough to
authorize him to defend the habitation with deadly force.
Clearly, the defendant in the case at bar was not occupying the
residence at 550 West 400 North (Tr. 6, 94) and further,
defendant was not authorized or invited onto the premises (Tr.
6) .
Finally, defendant asserts that a reasonable basis in
the evidence existed to support the defendant's theory of defense
of habitation and the trial court erred in not permitting a jury
instruction on this defense.
The burden of showing error in a jury instruction is on
the party who seeks to upset the judgment.
P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).

State v. Noren, 740

The defendant has failed to show any

error.
A defendant's entitlement to a jury instruction on his
theory of the case is not absolute.

It is conditioned upon the

existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the
giving of the proposed instruction.
1211, 1213 (Utah 1980).

State v. Eagle# 611 P.2d

The guidelines as to whether or not a

jury instruction should be given are as follows:

If the defendant's evidence, although in
material conflict with the State's proofr be
such that the jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in
self-defense, he is entitled to have the
jury instructed fully and clearly on the
law of self-defense. Conversely, if all
reasonable men must conclude that the
evidence is so slight as to be incapable of
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's
mind as to whether a defendant accused of
a crime acted in self-defense, tendered
instructions thereon are properly refused.
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265-66 (Utah 1980) citing State v.
Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969).
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).

See also

In the case at bar

the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the
defense of habitation since no reasonable basis in the evidence
justified the giving of the proposed instruction.

See pp. 3-8

supra.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT.
Defendant claims that the trial court gave inordinate
weight to defendant's prior arrest record in imposing a prison
sentence, and thus defendant was denied due process.
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(3)
(1953) as amended, provides that the sentencing authority must
recognize and carefully consider the possibilities of
rehabilitation of an individual offender when deciding the
appropriate penalty (App. Br. 16). However, § 76-1-104(3) also
provides that the judge prescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses.

Section 76-1-104(3) (1953) provides:
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general
purposes. . •
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and
which permit recognition or differences in
rehabilitation possibilities among individual
offenders.
The sentence imposed by a trial judge will not be
disturbed, unless it is in excess of his authority or there is an
abuse of discretion.

State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981).

This Court has stated that before it would overturn the sentence
imposed by the trial court, "it must be clear that the actions of
the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of
discretion."

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

See also State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984).
Prior to sentencing the defendant, the lower court
ordered a presentence report (Tr. 199). This report included the
defendant's version of the incident leading to defendant's
arrest, the victim's statement, and other background information
on the defendant including his prior criminal record, his marital
and educational background and his employment history (R. 361369).

It is clear from the presentence report that the

investigator did not solely rely upon defendant's prior arrest
record in making his recommendation but also considered the
seriousness of the offense and the possibility of rehabilitation.
The investigator expressed concern in the following areas:
defendant's serious alcohol problems, the defendant's use of a
firearm in the offense, the fact that victims suffered bodily
injury, and the defendant's disregard for the law (R. 369).

At the original sentencing hearing on December 6, 1985,
defendant's counsel expressed concern to the reference in the
presentence report to the defendant's prior record, and went into
an in-depth discussion of defendant's past history (Tr. 201-206).
At defendant's request, the trial court ordered him to undergo a
ninety-day diagnostic evaluation (Tr. 209).
The diagnostic reports indicated that if the defendant
were left in the community, there would be a significant
probability that he would commit more offenses, and that the most
appropriate place for him to deal with his problems is within the
prison setting (Supp. R. 5 ) .
At the time of sentencing on March 3, 1986, the court
heard argument as to whether defendant should be placed into a
substance abuse program (Tr. 210-217, 219-220) and defense
counsel again explained defendant's prior criminal record (Tr.
214-217) . The lower court additionally elicited testimony from
the defendant concerning his susbstance abuse history (Tr. 220223) .
Before pronouncing sentence, the court stated, "The
charge with which you are charged here is a serious offense:

the

use of a firearm in my mind is always a very serious offense."
(T. 223). The court then sentenced defendant to not less than
zero to five years on Count I and not less than zero to five
years on Count II in the Utah State Penitentiary.

The Court

further recommended that the defendant receive treatment for
alcohol and drug abuse (Tr. 223-224).

The defendant suggests that the lower court improperly
relied on the defendants prior arrest record in imposing a
prison sentence.

This Court recently held in State v. Sweat, 31

Utah Adv. Rep. 29,

P.2d

(April 8, 1986) that so long as

basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural
fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in
considering any and all information that reasonably may bear on
the proper sentence.
In the case at barf the judge made his decision based
upon the information in the presentence report and the 90 day
diagnostic report that defendant had a history of chronic alcohol
abuse and a violent personality, and further, that defendant used
a firearm in the offense.

CIearlyf defendant's sentence was not

based solely upon his arrest record.

The record as a whole

establishes that the defendant was not denied his due process
rights and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion such that
this court should overturn the sentence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon

the foregoing, the defendant's conviction

and sentencing should be affirmed.
DATED this J? f

day of September, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General
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